Re: [TLS] DSA should die

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Thu, 02 April 2015 00:48 UTC

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Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2015 19:48:36 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA should die
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On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 7:40 PM, Stephen Farrell
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> <no-hats-except-the-330+-ciphersuites-is-crap-hat>
>
> Here's a suggestion: why pick 'em off one by one? How about
> creating a new registry that only includes stuff we think is
> really good for TLS1.3?
>
> Personally, I'd go further and argue that the new registry
> only specify the TLS 1.3 MTIs, but that's a different question:-)
>
> I'd even argue that that new registry be defined so it only
> has space for two of anything - in other words maybe structure
> the new registry like the nice list in the MTI mail thread, [1]
> and then say how to map that to the old registry that has all
> 330+ ciphersuites including the good, the bad and the downright
> ugly.

It would be easier to specify the inputs to the cartesian product.

It would be better to also negotiate (cipher+mode), (hash), (KDF), and
(key agreement+server authentication) separately.

Nico
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