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Re: [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie-00

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Fri, 23 January 2015 23:31 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2015 18:31:40 -0500
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie-00
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On Friday, January 23, 2015 05:16:30 pm Martin Thomson wrote:
> On 23 January 2015 at 13:13, Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com> wrote:
> > should it also update RFC4346 (TLS 1.1) and RFC2246 (TLS 1.0)?
> 
> Those are deprecated, so I think we are safe in not doing so.  But I'm
> happy to listen to arguments for that.

The SSL2 prohibition RFC listed them all.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6176

Maintaining consistency for SSL3 seems logical.

If the message is that the IETF recommends against the usage of SSL for any reason, then officially updating all three probably makes sense. It's obviously not likely to affect anything in practice, though.

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