[TLS]Re: Trust Anchor Negotiation Surveillance Concerns and Risks

Dennis Jackson <ietf@dennis-jackson.uk> Sun, 21 July 2024 23:04 UTC

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From: Dennis Jackson <ietf@dennis-jackson.uk>
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Subject: [TLS]Re: Trust Anchor Negotiation Surveillance Concerns and Risks
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On 20/07/2024 11:23, David Benjamin wrote:

> On Sat, Jul 20, 2024, 06:13 Mike Shaver <mike.shaver@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>     In what way are these non-web systems not allowed to use other PKI
>     models today? How would trust anchors provide that permission?
>
>
> If the same server serves both embedded/IoT traffic and web browser 
> traffic, but we aim for the two to use different PKIs, the server 
> needs to arrange to serve different certificates to each. To do that, 
> we need trust anchor negotiation story.

I'm not sure you're talking about the same systems as Mike.

We've seen a number of recent incidents where CAs have delayed 
revocation of mis-issued certificates for 'critical' services that are 
not accessible on the public web [1]. The vast majority of these 
services could already migrate to a private PKI today but they simply 
don't have adequate incentives to make the small investment necessary. 
How would Trust Expressions or Trust Anchors change that?

Even for the tiny fraction of IoT services that have the misfortune to 
be on the public web and also popular with browsers. I don't understand 
why you think Trust Anchor Negotiation is a competitive solution.

The operator can choose at any time to start migrating their IoT devices 
to a new URL which is not shared with browser clients and uses a private 
PKI. This has the same outcome as T.E. / T.A., without needing to ship a 
new TLS library to the IoT devices. How would you sell an investment in 
deploying and operating Trust Anchors or Trust Expressions to these 
companies?

I feel a lot of the conversation on the benefits of these proposals is 
being derailed by the large number of use cases you're jumping between.

It might be very be productive to take Rich's suggestion on focusing on 
one or two key problems that you want to solve and invest some time in 
explaining how your proposals handle the critical aspects around 
adoption. Some key questions would be: Who are we asking to deploy these 
designs? What is the incentive for them to do the necessary work?

This doesn't mean you have to abandon the other use cases, but I think 
one or two well-explained use cases covering the key details would be 
much more persuasive to the WG than the current barrage of 9 or 10 use 
cases which leave more questions than they answer [2].

Best,
Dennis

[1] e.g Entrust and Chunghwa Telecom

[2] See also my previous comments 
https://github.com/dennisjackson/trust-negotiation-comments/blob/main/comments-on-usecases.md