Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS extension RI w/MCSV
Michael Gray <mickgray@au1.ibm.com> Mon, 14 December 2009 04:55 UTC
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To: David-Sarah Hopwood <david-sarah@jacaranda.org>
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From: Michael Gray <mickgray@au1.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2009 14:55:08 +1000
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS extension RI w/MCSV
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David-Sarah Hopwood <david-sarah@jacaranda.org> wrote: > Michael Gray wrote: > > I see two use cases here; > > > > A. Existing implementations that send extensions today and are therefore > > are fine to add this additional extension. Note: this means they are > > already sending extensions, not just extension capable. By applying this > > fix nothing changes with the protocol being used. > > > > B. Existing implementations that do not send any extensions today and as > > such they must not change the protocol due to this fix, which means they > > can only safely use the MCSV as the signaling method. > > > > It seems to me that we simply need the appropriate wording to allow > > implementers to decide the best strategy that needs to adopted based on > > risk factors to deployed production environments rather than mandate A > > which will break some production environments or mandate B which means that > > extension using systems must use the CipherSuite method. > > What is the disadvantage of extension-using systems having to use the > CipherSuite method? I've heard only vague aesthetic objections so far; > nothing concerned with more substantive factors such as code complexity, > security, or interoperability. Yes, I do not believe a technical objection to the CipherSuite method has been presented, but rather it seems to me to be a question of technical preference. - Mick > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
- [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS extension… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Michael Gray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Dieter Bratko
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Michael Gray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… tom.petch
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Steve Checkoway
- [TLS] Black hole was Re: Analysis of Interop scen… tom.petch
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Michael Gray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Michael Gray
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Black hole was Re: Analysis of Interop … Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Black hole was Re: Analysis of Interop … Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Black hole was Re: Analysis of Interop … Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Black hole was Re: Analysis of Interop … Bill Frantz
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Analysis of Interop scenarios TLS exten… Marsh Ray