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Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] 3DES diediedie

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Thu, 25 August 2016 10:01 UTC

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To: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
References: <D3E489EA.4EC34%john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2016 11:00:54 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] 3DES diediedie
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On 25/08/16 10:54, John Mattsson wrote:
> I think the recently published attack has more to do with bad
> implementations/specification than a newly discovered weakness in 3DES.
> That you should never encrypt anything near 2^32 blocks is well known (but
> I don’t know how well this is explained in NIST or IETF specifications, if
> at all).
> 
> I am very supportive of everything speeding up the deprecation of weak

Just in case folks haven't considered it, the "d" in the name of
the IETF's curdle WG [1] stands for deprecation. Obviously that
has to be done with care and consideration, but there is a generic
venue where folks can propose that kind of thing.

Cheers,
S.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/wg/curdle/

> algorithms and protocols, but  then I think CFRG should make a broader
> approach and look at more candidates for general deprecation like SHA-1
> signatures, 1024-bit MODP, and 1024-bit RSA… I think all of these are far
> weaker than 3-key 3DES.
> 
> Making sure that IETF provides good implementation guidelines and
> requirements for all ciphers might be as important.
> 
> /John
> 
> 
> On 25/08/16 05:28, "Cfrg on behalf of Peter Gutmann"
> <cfrg-bounces@irtf.org on behalf of pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
> 
>> Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> writes:
>>
>>> Should there be a 3DES "diediedie"?
>>
>> Only if there's an actualy issue.  3DES is still very widely supported
>> (particularly in financial systems and embedded), and provides a useful
>> backup to AES.  An attack that recovers cookie if you can record 785GB
>> of traffic isn't anything I'm losing any sleep over.
>>
>> Peter.
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
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> TLS@ietf.org
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>

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