Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI

Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> Wed, 12 September 2007 23:30 UTC

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Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2007 16:26:33 -0700
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
To: "Yee, Peter" <pyee@rsasecurity.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI
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At Wed, 12 Sep 2007 19:27:17 -0400,
Yee, Peter wrote:
> 
> Just AES in general or a specific key size and mode?  I'd generally
> favor the move, although I recognize that AES will probably be slower
> than RC4 so there will be those who would resist the move.  Despite
> that, I'd be in favor of AES-GCM as MTI as it's a whole lot better
> than 3DES_EDE_CBC.

The current algorithm is 3DES_EDE_CBC. I would imagine we would use
AES_128_CBC. It's a much easier substitution than GCM and most
TLS stacks already support AES-CBC.

-Ekr

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