Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

[Sean Turner <[e-mail]>]

Okay that was a fail on my part I meant to put all 6 in.  Updated the PR.

spt

> On Mar 1, 2018, at 20:05, Martin Thomson <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> I think that I was suggesting this:
> 
>  The following values SHALL be marked as
>  "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
>  rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
>  rsa_pss_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_pss_sha384,rsa_pss_pss_sha512, and
>  ed25519.
> 
> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 11:45 AM, Sean Turner <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>>> On Mar 1, 2018, at 16:31, Martin Thomson <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 7:32 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>> To expound a bit more on my thinking, pss_pss is what we actually want
>>>> people to be using, thus it should be Recommended, but pss_rsae is what
>>>> people are actually going to be using (to large extent), and that is
>>>> still a deployment that we consider good and useful, for now.  Maybe in
>>>> 5 years the IESG can change those "yes"es to "no"s, of course.
>>> 
>>> I think that I agree.  For recommendations PSS is fine.  If the
>>> question is MTI, then I think we're stuck with pss_rsae.
>> 
>> I’ll submitted a revised PR [0] to change that will swap out the rsa_pss_sha* with rsa_pss_rsae_sha*:
>> 
>> OLD:
>> 
>>  The following values SHALL be marked as
>>  "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
>>  rsa_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_sha384, rsa_pss_sha512, ed25519.
>> 
>> NEW:
>> 
>>  The following values SHALL be marked as
>>  "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
>>  rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, and
>>  ed25519.
>> 
>> spt
>> 
>> [0] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1159