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Re: [TLS] padding bug

Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> Tue, 24 September 2013 10:24 UTC

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Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 11:24:18 +0100
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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] padding bug
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On 24 September 2013 09:09, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org> wrote:
> On 09/24/2013 07:17 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>> Just a small amount of Schadenfreude here when I point out that as I was
>> reading through the long list of GnuTLS security advisories at
>> http://www.gnutls.org/security.html it seems that a number of them would have
>> been avoided through the use of the EtM that Nikos has been so strongly
>> opposed to :-).
>
> I don't understand what does this prove. I was one of the first to ask
> for a solution to the issue. Pointing an issue in your draft doesn't
> mean I'm against solving the problem.

The issue you claim is that it does not defend against key recovery
attacks. I am not aware of any key recovery attacks against HMAC, and
MAC truncation was not proposed as a countermeasure for a key recovery
attack against any MAC.

Can you provide a reference for your claim?

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