Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00

Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> Wed, 25 October 2017 17:27 UTC

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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2017 13:27:42 -0400
Message-ID: <CAH8yC8kQPxzU0+fz39RdQy4=zVGiXN0uGkE==aJfvmk2Ah0AXg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Roland Zink <roland@zinks.de>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00
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On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 12:21 PM, Roland Zink <roland@zinks.de>; wrote:
> It could but RFC 7469 section 2.6
> (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7469#section-2.6) says:
>
> "  It is acceptable to allow Pin
>    Validation to be disabled for some Hosts according to local policy.
>    For example, a UA may disable Pin Validation for Pinned Hosts whose
>    validated certificate chain terminates at a user-defined trust
>    anchor, rather than a trust anchor built-in to the UA (or underlying
>    platform)."
>
> and most browsers seem to follow this mitm exception.

The browsers are also complicit in the coverup. Reporting the broken
pinset to the user or site is a  "should not", even though
organizational policies and regulations may require it.

Jeff