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Re: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Thu, 13 November 2014 18:18 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2014 13:18:13 -0500
Thread-Topic: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3
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I think the major concern is that this is a pretty radical change from the current deployment model of SSL/TLS.  For what it's worth, I think it's cool and clever and has a number of real nice properties. But we are already getting 'picked on' for adding too many new things, and I am concerned that adding this, fairly late in the game, will delay the deployment of TLS 1.3 as people will take a step back and consider if they really need to use this revolutionary new protocol, rather than the evolutionary changes they were expecting.

I used my personal opinion here, but I feel pretty comfortable saying I'm not the only one who feels this way. It's a case of "too much, too late."

Does that make sense?

Can we wrap up TLS 1.3 and perhaps do a TLS 2 based on these concepts, including a  non-CA trust model?

	/r$

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