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Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuites

Judson Wilson <wilson.judson@gmail.com> Tue, 21 August 2018 05:41 UTC

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From: Judson Wilson <wilson.judson@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Aug 2018 22:41:20 -0700
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To: Lyndon Nerenberg <lyndon@orthanc.ca>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuites
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Inventing your own null cipher security opens up the door for replay,
withhold and reorder styles of attacks.


On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 9:20 PM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> Lyndon Nerenberg <lyndon@orthanc.ca> writes:
>
> >By law, we are forbidden from transmitting encrypted traffic, yet there
> are
> >use cases where integrity protection in the absence of data content
> >protection would be of benefit.
>
> I've worked a lot with a set of authentication-only channels that can't be
> encrypted but need strong integrity/authenticity protection.  The way to
> deal
> with this is signed/MAC'd messages, not NULL-cipher TLS.
>
> Peter.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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