Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3

Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com> Mon, 21 September 2020 12:01 UTC

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From: Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 14:01:23 +0200
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To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
Cc: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@ml.filippo.io>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
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Hi Hannes

Yes it has been tested with several  3.04 Javacards  commercially available

In the draft https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-se-00   Section
5-ISO 7816 Use Case, the exchanges are done with the existing implementation

TLS-SE TLS1.3 PSK+ECDH server works with ESP8266 or Arduino+Ethernet boards

For client software we use OPENSSL or WolfSSL

Pascal




Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 12:35, Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
a écrit :

> Hi Pascal,
>
> Thanks for the pointer to the draft.
>
> Since I am surveying implementations for the update of RFC 7925 (see
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile/) I was
> wondering whether there is an implementation of this approach.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
>
> From: Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com>
> Sent: Monday, September 21, 2020 11:44 AM
> To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
> Cc: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@ml.filippo.io>io>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
>
> Hi All
>
> Here is an example of PSK+ECDHE for IoT
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-se-00  uses TLS1.3 server
> PSK+ECDHE for secure elements
>
> The security level in these devices is as high as EAL5+
>
> The computing time is about 1.4s for a PSK+ECDHE session (AES-128-CCM, +
> secp256r1)
>
> The real critical resource is the required RAM size, less than 1KB in our
> experiments
>
> The secure element  only needs a classical TCP/IP interface (i.e. sockets
> like)
>
> Trusted PSK should avoid selfie attacks
>
> Pascal
>
>
>
> Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 11:29, Hannes Tschofenig <mailto:
> Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> a écrit :
> Hi Filippo,
>
> • Indeed, if the SCADA industry has a particular need, they should profile
> TLS for use in that industry, and not require we change the recommendation
> for the open Internet.
>
> We have an IoT profile for TLS and it talks about the use of PSK, see
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7925
>
> On the “open Internet” (probably referring to the Web usage) you are not
> going to use PSKs in TLS. There is a separate RFC that provides
> recommendations for that environmnent, see RFC 752. That RFC is currently
> being revised, see
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sheffer-uta-rfc7525bis/
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
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