[TLS] Implicit ACKs in post-handshake
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 23 April 2020 20:49 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 13:48:42 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] Implicit ACKs in post-handshake
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Hi folks, As I was going through the ACK clarifications, I noticed that we were requiring explicit ACKs for everything other than post-handshake client auth, where we allow implicit ACK. This obviously works, but given that (1) we expect explicit ACK from the client if there is a user-consent delay and (2) it's the only one, what would people think of using implicit ACKs only for the handshake itself. -Ekr
- [TLS] Implicit ACKs in post-handshake Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Implicit ACKs in post-handshake Hanno Becker
- Re: [TLS] Implicit ACKs in post-handshake Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Implicit ACKs in post-handshake Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Implicit ACKs in post-handshake Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Implicit ACKs in post-handshake Christopher Wood