Re: [TLS] TLS-OBC proposal

Anders Rundgren <> Sun, 04 September 2011 16:41 UTC

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Date: Sun, 04 Sep 2011 18:42:47 +0200
From: Anders Rundgren <>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS-OBC proposal
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I have probably not understood the TLS-OBC proposal but one part
spurred my interest and that was that apparently (?) an application
eventually ends-up with a session cookie rather than the horrible
(at least from a web context seen... ), TLS session scheme.

If this assumption is correct, I think it would be a pity "patching"
the HTTPS protocol without being able to also use the above with
traditional client-certificates.  In fact, I think this proposal will
go pretty much nowhere unless it does.

If I OTOH have go the session-stuff wrong, please just ignore my
ignorant comments.  FWIW, I have developed an app-level CCA
(Client-Certificate Authentication) mechanism derived from the
numerous proprietary solutions out there.

If you come up with a generic solution, I will gladly retire it!

Traditional TLS-CCA sucks, and logout is by no means
"a subtle UI problem"; it goes to the core.