Return-Path: X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F4B81A1B4B for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 14:06:58 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.977 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.977 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FHh55jz0Jojz for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 14:06:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-wi0-f170.google.com (mail-wi0-f170.google.com [209.85.212.170]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 180F91A1B40 for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 14:06:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: by wicfx3 with SMTP id fx3so2306844wic.0 for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 14:06:33 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-type; bh=cotsW/GPBivf4pmTQ7yZBTsngxIyqRp/ZEWqbSlg5Iw=; b=Wj8Kcd5bZYBOTLim79nGSscM7m0blT6RGLhf2mgC6X8dGlceIRHVR1sP/ijiWRxQPO cCeSZhom4N3OL2JJ3PEvWvRrUznoJjpPus5hIHaXiXhFPrPux5OihobTCM78laqgZKfx bhW5RwI69oPsp7uxgUQZQYstCEsTprcJIdn4q/myiqKZo8AIz6/znyVKTRFyr8BzFaZF H2V/A4+IV+fQG0/VkX/bYwiECR+4H1KSUPANmvPK7KrCkMi+vitXvx8m1PtrgsCSOqc1 DoRFRaI1ZmfYi72+Uc5F5nrCSINz3NjuofLzjSjwBWh1SzcUhtX69+qcgiLL43jL73IO zkGw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQnMpdXIbpEqP7SyxbNugZllftuoiwszmEREb2KPdTkclJz+lOeyQ2n4bLgaEWaJvHt0lmHb X-Received: by 10.194.60.243 with SMTP id k19mr25811250wjr.8.1442437593482; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 14:06:33 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.27.79.200 with HTTP; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 14:05:53 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20150916210113.GP13294@localhost> References: <20150916210113.GP13294@localhost> From: Eric Rescorla Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 14:05:53 -0700 Message-ID: To: Nico Williams Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b8736cc5f3fc3051fe3ac93 Archived-At: Cc: "tls@ietf.org" Subject: Re: [TLS] Call for consensus to remove anonymous DH X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 21:06:58 -0000 --047d7b8736cc5f3fc3051fe3ac93 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 In addition, they are already part of TLS, so the question would be if we have consensus to remove them.... -Ekr On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 2:01 PM, Nico Williams wrote: > On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 01:20:37PM -0700, Brian Smith wrote: > > I think it is a good idea to remove DH_anon_* and similar ECDH_anon_* > > cipher suites. > > > > This isn't an endorsement of the raw public key modes. > > Sure, one can always use self-signed certs (at an even higher cost to do > anonymity). If we're going to raise the cost of anonymity for the sake > of simplicity in TLS 1.3, do let's try to keep that cost from > escalating. Raw public keys are not a large additional complexity cost. > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > --047d7b8736cc5f3fc3051fe3ac93 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
In addition, they are already part of TLS, so the question= would be if we have
consensus to remove them....

-Ekr


On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 2:01 PM, Nico Williams <= nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 01:20:37PM -0700, Brian Smith w= rote:
> I think it is a good idea to remove DH_anon_* and similar ECDH_anon_*<= br> > cipher suites.
>
> This isn't an endorsement of the raw public key modes.

Sure, one can always use self-signed certs (at an even higher cost t= o do
anonymity).=C2=A0 If we're going to raise the cost of anonymity for the= sake
of simplicity in TLS 1.3, do let's try to keep that cost from
escalating.=C2=A0 Raw public keys are not a large additional complexity cos= t.

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