Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - some issues related to PKCS11

["Salz, Rich" <[e-mail]>]

>I want to protect inside of the HSM all of the following:
>a) the private keys related to the server or client identity
>b) the pre-master key
>c) the master key
>d) the session keys.
>I want to be able to do all the cryptographic processing inside that module and only allow out true plain text.

The programming model for such a beast is probably more like an I/O processor than an HSM.  You need input and output "local plaintext" data streams, and the same for "to/from the network crypto streams."  And ways to signal "I can't give you more plaintext until you write this on the network and get more data back from the other side."  And so on.

Have you seen a market need for this kind of thing?  Have you got an API designed?  I'd be curious about both.

I also don't understand why you do not trust the host software with the ability to decrypt its own data (i.e,. session) when you don't have control over what it does with the plaintext, like copy it over to an adversary directly.

	/r$
 
--  
Principal Security Engineer
Akamai Technology
Cambridge, MA