[TLS] Re: TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbinding Attacks
Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> Mon, 18 November 2024 10:52 UTC
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Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2024 12:52:01 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbinding Attacks
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On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 08:25:12AM +0200, Mohit Sethi wrote: > The lesson here is the same countermeasure for all misbinding attack - be > explicit about the identities and check them. We have created a pull request > for 8446bis adding a reference to misbinding attacks and countermeasures > when using RPK. The goal was to keep the text to a minimum: > > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1366 For application protocols that carry identities (many do), those should be checked instead of checking SNI. SNI can never be trusted over application-level identities. -Ilari
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbindin… Dennis Jackson
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbindin… Bas Westerbaan
- [TLS] TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbinding At… John Mattsson
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbindin… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbindin… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbindin… Tschofenig, Hannes
- [TLS] Re: TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbindin… Mohit Sethi
- [TLS] Re: TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbindin… Achim Kraus
- [TLS] Re: TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbindin… Viktor Dukhovni
- [TLS] Re: TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbindin… Ilari Liusvaara
- [TLS] Re: TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbindin… Mohit Sethi
- [TLS] Re: TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbindin… Viktor Dukhovni
- [TLS] Re: TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbindin… Achim Kraus
- [TLS] Re: TLS 1.3, Raw Public Keys, and Misbindin… Peter Gutmann