[TLS] Potential New Handshake Flows for TLS 1.3

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 05 November 2013 21:09 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 13:08:55 -0800
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To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Potential New Handshake Flows for TLS 1.3
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I've just submitted a document on potentially new reduced RT/more
private protocol flows for TLS 1.3. It's fairly handwavy ATM but I wanted
to err on the side of getting some of the ideas out for discussion
so we could figure out which avenues we want to pursue. This draft
borrows (steals) liberally from a bunch of prior work too numerous
to name here.

I'll be going over some of this material at today's meeting, but seeing
as how this just got delivered, I'll make sure you don't need to have
read the draft to follow along.

Sorry about the late delivery....

-Ekr


Filename:        draft-rescorla-tls13-new-flows
Revision:        00
Title:           New Handshake Flows for TLS 1.3
Creation date:   2013-11-05
Group:           Individual Submission
Number of pages: 21
URL:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rescorla-tls13-new-flows-00.txt
Status:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rescorla-tls13-new-flows
Htmlized:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rescorla-tls13-new-flows-00


Abstract:
   This document sketches some potential new handshake flows for TLS
   1.3.