Re: [TLS] Revision 10: possible attack if client authentication is allowed during PSK
Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Sun, 01 November 2015 03:39 UTC
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Sam Scott <sam.scott89@gmail.com>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Revision 10: possible attack if client authentication is allowed during PSK
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On 31/10/15 13:55, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > Thanks again for your contribution here. It's really important to have > this kind of analysis, especially at this stage before the design is > completely > hardened. +many, Thanks, S.
- [TLS] Revision 10: possible attack if client auth… Sam Scott
- Re: [TLS] Revision 10: possible attack if client … Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Revision 10: possible attack if client … Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Revision 10: possible attack if client … Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Revision 10: possible attack if client … Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Revision 10: possible attack if client … Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Revision 10: possible attack if client … Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Revision 10: possible attack if client … Karthikeyan Bhargavan