Re: [TLS] Serious crypto problem fixed by envelope HMAC methodinstead of currently used prefix

"Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu> Mon, 27 November 2006 19:52 UTC

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Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2006 14:52:31 -0500
From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
To: "Blumenthal, Uri" <uri.blumenthal@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Serious crypto problem fixed by envelope HMAC methodinstead of currently used prefix
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On Mon, 27 Nov 2006 14:31:04 -0500
"Blumenthal, Uri" <uri.blumenthal@intel.com> wrote:

> >> SSLv3 used a variant of the original HMAC (pre-2104).
> >> IIRC, SSLv2 didn't use HMAC and *did* have an extension
> >> attack, but that's hardly our problem at this point.
> >
> > But does SSL v2 has the lenth field protection
> > (as we discussed) against an extension attack?
> > Can somebody send me the function used in SSL v2?
> 
> As SSLv2 is a technically-dead protocol (that is not thrown out from
> the code only for compatibility reasons), how relevant is it now???
> 
Agreed.  SSLv2 has other flaws beyond that.  Besides, if memory serves,
IE7 doesn't include it, which means that it's quite irrelevant going
forward.

Finally -- we're defining TLS versions; we're not trying to repair
flaws in SSLv2 or even v3.  I don't see the relevance of the question
to this WG.


		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb

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