Re: [TLS] draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-01

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Sat, 08 July 2017 17:39 UTC

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 10:39:43 -0700
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Cc: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-01
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On Sat, Jul 8, 2017 at 10:17 AM, Stephen Farrell
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>; wrote:
>
>
> On 08/07/17 18:05, Russ Housley wrote:
>> In draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13, there is not one.  I have not
>> thought about it in these terms.  The server, if acting in bad faith,
>> can always release the client's traffic.
> Is it bad faith if the server is compelled to enable this
> wiretap interface? For a wiretapper this is a great scheme,
> as they only need to force it to be turned on and accept a
> tiny bit of data and then they can pick up those packets
> from anywhere without having to deal with problems at the
> web server end. So no need to even re-imburse the web server
> for the intercepted access anymore.

The same applies to static RSA ciphersuites. I understand your desire
to move on with TLS 1.3, but we did burn what seemed to be a somewhat
important usecase to some people, and this draft demonstrates that TLS
1.3 can be deployed in datacenters without hurting that usecase. As
much as I think enterprise networks are suffering from bad design
decisions that solve problems with boxes and not endpoint changes,
this is a problem people are claiming to face, and there are some
security implications.

Servers already use static DH, in some cases by accident.
>
> Honestly, doesn't that clearly mean a conflict with 2804?
> And one that cannot afaics be avoided.

Why did static RSA not imply that?

>
> S.
>
>
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