[TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-whyte-qsh-tls13-01.txt

William Whyte <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com> Mon, 21 September 2015 03:00 UTC

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From: William Whyte <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-whyte-qsh-tls13-01.txt
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Hi all,

We've updated the TLS 1.3 Quantum Safe Handshake draft to use extensions as
suggested by DKG in Prague. All comments welcome.

There's an interesting issue here: McEliece keys, which should be
permissible, are larger in size (about 2^20 bytes) than the maximum
permissible extension size (2^16-1). In order to support McEliece keys it
might be worth increasing the maximum extension size to 2^24-1 for TLS 1.3.
Is there a strong reason for keeping the maximum size at 2^24-1, other than
saving one byte on all the relevant length fields?

Cheers,

William




---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
Date: Sun, Sep 20, 2015 at 10:32 PM
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-whyte-qsh-tls13-01.txt
To: Zhenfei Zhang <zzhang@securityinnovation.com>om>, William Whyte <
wwhyte@securityinnovation.com>gt;, "John M. Schanck" <
jschanck@securityinnovation.com>



A new version of I-D, draft-whyte-qsh-tls13-01.txt
has been successfully submitted by William Whyte and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-whyte-qsh-tls13
Revision:       01
Title:          Quantum-Safe Hybrid (QSH) Ciphersuite for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) version 1.3
Document date:  2015-09-20
Group:          Individual Submission
Pages:          18
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-whyte-qsh-tls13-01.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-whyte-qsh-tls13/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-whyte-qsh-tls13-01
Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-whyte-qsh-tls13-01

Abstract:
   This document describes the Quantum-Safe Hybrid ciphersuite, a new
   cipher suite providing modular design for quantum-safe cryptography
   to be adopted in the handshake for the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   protocol version 1.3.  In particular, it specifies the use of the
   NTRUEncrypt encryption scheme in a TLS handshake.





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