[TLS] comment on draft-ietf-tls-subcerts
Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> Mon, 04 November 2019 22:13 UTC
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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 04 Nov 2019 14:13:43 -0800
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Subject: [TLS] comment on draft-ietf-tls-subcerts
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Hi, I left a comment wondering how this draft might interact with security issues in the network layer, like the various kinds of BGP hijacking. https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/42 That's not to say this draft is the place to fix those problems, but it seems like it could make them more difficult to detect in some ways. I was surprised not to see this issue at least mentioned in the Security Considerations section. If I'm wrong to suspect this is a concern, it might be helpful to note why that is. thanks, Rob
- [TLS] comment on draft-ietf-tls-subcerts Rob Sayre