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Re: [TLS] TLS client puzzles

Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org> Thu, 30 June 2016 02:36 UTC

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To: Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>
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From: Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2016 19:36:32 -0700
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Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Dmitry Khovratovich <khovratovich@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS client puzzles
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Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org> writes:

> Let's finish that last sentence:
> 
> I have to think a lot more about the IoT/resource-constrained client
> problem, but I still don't think the existence of clients that would be
> denied service by this scheme renders the concept completely inapplicable.

Perhaps for the resource-constrained/IoT situation, what you want is
to mostly be using a pre-shared key, track clients, and only make the
suspicious (too many connections too fast) or new ones solve the
puzzle.

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