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Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-whyte-qsh-tls13-01.txt

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Mon, 21 September 2015 04:25 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org>
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2015 00:25:11 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-whyte-qsh-tls13-01.txt
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On Sunday, September 20, 2015 11:48:00 pm Geoffrey Keating wrote:
> William Whyte <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com> writes:
> > We've updated the TLS 1.3 Quantum Safe Handshake draft to use extensions as
> > suggested by DKG in Prague. All comments welcome.
> > 
> > There's an interesting issue here: McEliece keys, which should be
> > permissible, are larger in size (about 2^20 bytes) than the maximum
> > permissible extension size (2^16-1). In order to support McEliece keys it
> > might be worth increasing the maximum extension size to 2^24-1 for TLS 1.3.
> > Is there a strong reason for keeping the maximum size at 2^24-1, other than
> > saving one byte on all the relevant length fields?
> 
> That would affect the initial client hello, which I think we're trying
> to keep backwards compatible.  It might be better to just define a
> rule like "if multiple extensions with the same number are present,
> their values are concatenated".

Duplicate extensions are explicitly prohibited:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4

Attempting to do that feels like a good way to find an implementation to choke on it.

See also the other email I just sent, as this suggestion won't help.


Dave

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