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Re: [TLS] draft on new TLS key exchange

"Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> Fri, 07 October 2011 06:55 UTC

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Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2011 23:58:35 -0700
From: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Cc: tls@ietf.org, dhalasz@intwineenergy.com
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft on new TLS key exchange
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On Thu, October 6, 2011 11:47 pm, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> writes:
>
>>But EKE cannot be used with elliptic curves
>
> Speaking of PAKE for ECC, from reading a writeup of PACE (for passport
> EAC) a
> while back, the claimed reason for introducing PACE was that a lot of
> standard
> DLP PAKE mechanisms aren't secure when used with ECDLPs.  OTOH this RFC
> proposes a complex protocol for ECDLP use with no explanation of how it's
> derived, what its security properties are, or why it's secure.  What's the
> security argument for it?

  I'm sorry, but I don't understand. Are you asking questions of a different
PAKE scheme (PACE)? Which RFC are you talking about? Do you think there is
something missing from the security considerations of our draft? Is there
some statement of security, or argument, you'd like to see?

  Dan.

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