[TLS] Re: Mike Bishop's No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-12: (with COMMENT)

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 02 June 2025 15:36 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 02 Jun 2025 08:35:32 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Mike Bishop's No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-12: (with COMMENT)
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Thanks.

It might help to start with some background. While it's true that the IETF
has deprecated TLS versions prior to TLS 1.2, we also know that there
are many sites which support TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1. [0]

We would still like those implementations to perform anti-downgrade, despite
violating this other MUST. So, I don't think that treating this as a
historical
requirement is the right answer.

-Ekr


[0] https://www.ssllabs.com/ssl-pulse/





On Mon, Jun 2, 2025 at 7:40 AM Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be> wrote:

> Sorry, I should have quoted it. It's
> https://tlswg.org/tls13-spec/draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis.html#section-4.1.3-11 in
> the editor's copy:
>
> [RFC8996
> <https://tlswg.org/tls13-spec/draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis.html#RFC8996>] and
> Appendix E.5
> <https://tlswg.org/tls13-spec/draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis.html#backward-compatibility-security> forbid
> the negotiation of TLS versions below 1.2. However, server implementations
> which do not follow that guidance MUST set the last 8 bytes of their
> ServerHello.random value to the bytes:
>
>   44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00
>
> Appendix E.5 states that versions below 1.2 "MUST NOT be negotiated for
> any reason," yet this text then has a MUST-level requirement applying
> exclusively to server implementations which ignore the MUST NOT.
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
> *Sent:* Friday, May 30, 2025 10:54 AM
> *To:* Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be>
> *Cc:* The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>; draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis@ietf.org <
> draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis@ietf.org>; tls-chairs@ietf.org <
> tls-chairs@ietf.org>; tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org>; sean@sn3rd.com <
> sean@sn3rd.com>
> *Subject:* Re: Mike Bishop's No Objection on
> draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-12: (with COMMENT)
>
> Thank you for comments. I have made a PR to address most of these comments:
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1385
>
> I am a bit unsure about one comment. Can you point to the offending text
> for the
> comment below:
>
>
> The language around the SCSV for pre-1.2 values feels odd. You MUST NOT
> negotiate older versions, but if you do anyway, you MUST do it this way? I
> would shift this to a description of how clients and servers were required
> to
> behave prior to this revision of 1.3 at most.
>
>