Re: [TLS] Fixing TLS

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 12 January 2016 20:18 UTC

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References: <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4BC6849@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> <201601121202.26624.davemgarrett@gmail.com> <CAH9QtQFASZENynns9=o-zHk=orfR6PcqKL9v5ByirmVcTQAQeA@mail.gmail.com> <201601121439.15891.davemgarrett@gmail.com> <CAH9QtQHu_TiC2SfdurCfv__yBRVJLdiyn58g-A940nvPnC8EAw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 12:18:11 -0800
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To: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fixing TLS
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On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 12:12 PM, Bill Cox <waywardgeek@google.com>; wrote:

> On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 11:39 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>;
> wrote:
>
>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2016 02:27:02 pm Bill Cox wrote:
>>
>> Personally, I hope this new version of TLS, save for possibly some minor
>> update & extensions, is the final version. I hope that Google's efforts to
>> get QUIC as-is specced out go quickly and smoothly, and that it can be used
>> as a basis to develop an official total TCP/TLS replacement. (the early
>> documentation for QUIC was horrible, but the current work is vastly
>> improved) As far as I'm concerned, TLS 1.3 is a transitional measure which
>> should only be used in the medium-term by those who adopt new tech very
>> slowly, and in the long-term phased out entirely. It is a very important
>> transitional measure that needs to be done with as high a security and
>> performance as possible, but a finite one nonetheless. (well, arguably,
>> pretty much everything is, given a long enough timeframe ;) We have to get
>> through the short-term to get to the long-term, though.
>>
>>
>> Dave
>>
>
> I wish that were the plan (to upgrade QUIC crypto and eventually make that
> the new crypto platform).  If I am not mistaken, QUICK crypto is going to
> be archived, TLS 1.3 will replace the crypto code, and QUIC will remain the
> transport layer.
>

This is my understanding as well, based both onconversations with the QUIC
folks, and Adam and Jana's public presentations. A number of us (MT, I,
Jana, Ian, AGL, Christian) have already started some initial conversations
at how to do that.

With that said, I don't think there's a plausible story in which QUIC
becomes the only
transport protocol in the world any time soon, so I don't think standalone
TLS 1.3
is going away.

-Ekr