Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3
Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org> Wed, 21 January 2015 16:59 UTC
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Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2015 17:58:57 +0100
From: Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3
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Hi, Salz, Rich wrote: > > We need a cipher cage match. They call go in, and only a couple come out. > I'm not opposed to that. And am sure OCB would win over e.g. CCM. Also: I'm not suggesting OCB mode should be MTI. That's up to the people currently spec'ing TLS 1.3. GCM based ciphersuites seem like a good idea to be MTI. e.g. CCM do not. BTW: Amazed to find out that GOST is still in use (and still mandatory for russian gov./banking?). Nico Williams wrote: > On Wed, Jan 21, 2015 at 08:15:45AM -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote: >> On Wed, Jan 21, 2015 at 7:17 AM, Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org> wrote: >>> Any comments on the idea of removing the following two ciphersuites from >>> the draft? >>> >>> CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_OCB = {TBD9, TBD9} >>> CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_OCB = {TBD10, TBD10} >>> >>> I don't see how these would be relevant to embedded devices. > > If DHE_PSK is relevant to an embedded device then all cipher+mode > combinations might be as well. Obviously OCB wouldn't be required to > implement, but that's no reason to exclude any one subset of ciphersuits > using OCB. Well. No. Not really. Why would an embedded device prefer to do DHE over ECDHE? ECC operations are sure to be more efficient on embedded devices/IoT. That's was my reason to ask for removal. > >> If we generally think DHE_PSK is a good idea, is there a specific >> reason why it wouldn't be a good idea for OCB? > > There isn't. Embedded devices need not implement the full set of > suites. +1 > But really, this is once more about the gross inefficiency (in terms of > registration as well as number of bytes used on the wire) of cartesian > explosion ciphersuites. Can we fix this? What's your suggestion to fixing this? I totally agree that there are far too many ciphersuites around, which is somewhat ironical because I just suggested adding 10-12 more. But I'd really like to see and use OCB mode over CCM in TLS. This is also the reason I'm trying to get rid of as many unnecessary (or insecure) ciphersuites as possible for OCB. Aaron
- [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Matt Caswell
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Matt Caswell
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Matt Caswell
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Paul Lambert
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Joachim Strömbergson
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Phillip Rogaway
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Alex Elsayed
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Jack Lloyd
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Henrik Grubbström
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Dmitry Belyavsky
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Jack Lloyd
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- [TLS] GOST in TLS (Re: Inclusion of OCB mode in T… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] GOST in TLS (Re: Inclusion of OCB mode … Dmitry Belyavsky
- Re: [TLS] GOST in TLS (Re: Inclusion of OCB mode … Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- [TLS] PSK [was: Re: Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS … Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Jack Lloyd
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Jack Lloyd
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Roland Zink
- Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3 Aaron Zauner