[TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-11.txt

[Wang Guilin <[e-mail]>]

Thanks for the update.

Read Section 5 (Security Considerations). The following two parts could be improved, I think.

"However, composite signature schemes do not in general preserve strong unforgeability (SUF-CMA) once the traditional component algorithm is broken, for example due to the availability of CRQCs. "

This description seems not really accurate, as composite signature schemes [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs] do not preserve strong unforgeability (SUF-CMA) as long as either of the component signature algorithm is not SUF-CMA, not just in the case of "once the traditional component algorithm is broken".

But I do agree on "This loss of SUF is inherent to the composite construction and does not impact TLS".

Also, the following is just an attacking scenario for an adversary CRQC.

"TLS clients that support both post-quantum and traditional-only signature algorithms are vulnerable to downgrade attacks. In such scenarios, an attacker with access to a CRQC could forge a traditional server certificate and impersonate the server. If the client continues to accept traditional-only certificates for backward compatibility, it remains exposed to this risk."

In my understanding, a more natural and better hidden attack is to either compromise the server's private key or forge a valid signature w.r.t. the server's existing traditional public key certificate.

Cheers,

Guilin

From: tirumal reddy <[e-mail]>
Sent: Tuesday, 18 August 2026 9:18 pm
To: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
Subject: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-11.txt


Hi all,

We have published a revised version of the draft: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa. This revision incorporates the feedback received from the WG. The main changes include adding the missing composite algorithm based on the selection criteria in the draft, clarifying why the loss of SUF-CMA security does not impact TLS authentication, and adding downgrade security considerations.

Please take a look and let us know if there are any further comments or issues.

Thanks,
-Tiru
---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2026 at 18:19
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-11.txt
To: Tirumaleswar Reddy.K <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, Daniel Van Geest <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, John Gray <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, Scott Fluhrer <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, Timothy Hollebeek <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>


A new version of Internet-Draft draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-11.txt has
been successfully submitted by Tirumaleswar Reddy and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:     draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa
Revision: 11
Title:    Use of Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3
Date:     2026-08-18
Group:    Individual Submission
Pages:    16
URL:      https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-11.txt
Status:   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa/
HTML:     https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-11.html
HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa
Diff:     https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-11

Abstract:

   Compositing the post-quantum ML-DSA signature with traditional
   signature algorithms provides protection against potential breaks or
   critical bugs in ML-DSA or the ML-DSA implementation.  This document
   specifies how such a composite signature can be formed using ML-DSA
   with RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-PSS, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448 to provide
   authentication in TLS 1.3, including use in certificates.



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