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Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> Thu, 22 September 2016 23:50 UTC

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From: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 16:50:16 -0700
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To: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
wrote:

> If the problem is the use of forward secrecy then there is a simple
> solution, don't use it.
> That is, you can, as a server, have a fixed key_share for which the secret
> exponent becomes the private key exactly as in the RSA case. It does
> require some careful analysis, though.
>

I think that this may be possible for TLS1.3 0-RTT data, but not for other
data where an ephemeral key will be generated based also on a parameter
that the client chooses.

-- 
Colm

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