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Re: [TLS] Defining "TLS channel"

David-Sarah Hopwood <david-sarah@jacaranda.org> Mon, 07 December 2009 22:50 UTC

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Date: Mon, 07 Dec 2009 22:50:46 +0000
From: David-Sarah Hopwood <david-sarah@jacaranda.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Defining "TLS channel"
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David-Sarah Hopwood wrote:
> Nicolas Williams wrote:
>> Following the fix to the re-negotiation vulnerability I think we should
>> say that the first negotiation establishes a channel and that the
>> subsequent ones do not, just as in SSHv2.
> 
> In that case any attempt by the application to synchronously retrieve
> identity information associated with the channel [abstraction],

including the tls-unique channel binding value

> may be subject to
> race conditions. It is possible to just document that problem and
> leave applications to deal with it, but I have little confidence that
> they will do so correctly. If, OTOH, the channel abstraction is
> per-handshake, then the application can rely on the identity information
> remaining constant for a given channel.

-- 
David-Sarah Hopwood  ⚥  http://davidsarah.livejournal.com

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