Re: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5246 (5409)

Eugène Adell <eugene.adell@gmail.com> Wed, 27 June 2018 08:08 UTC

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From: =?UTF-8?Q?Eug=C3=A8ne_Adell?= <eugene.adell@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 10:08:43 +0200
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, Tim Dierks <tim@dierks.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Joe Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5246 (5409)
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>From what you both are saying, it looks legitimate to document about this
cipher which disappeared. But not here.
As suggested I will post another editorial errata for RFC2712, in an
appendix form.

Eugene.

2018-06-27 5:30 GMT+02:00 Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>;:

> I don't really think this is a useful erratum against 5246; the note there
> is providing an explanation for why certain values are not used (and should
> not be used).  But, now, and even at the time 5246 was published, 0x001e
> *is* used, and there's no reason to mention it in this context.  One could
> perhaps argue that 2712 should have noted that a value was being reused (or
> have not reused the value at all), and an errata report against 2712 to add
> a new appendix section might be reasonable.
>
> So, absent additional considerations, I plan to reject this report.
>
> -Ben
>
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 04:01:35PM +0200, Eugène Adell wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > I had some doubts whether it was technical or editorial, and I have
> looked
> > at some accepted errata to choose (maybe not the best method) . I thought
> > it was technical, because one cipher suite was replaced by another one,
> and
> > the note already existing gives their numbers, which is a technical
> > information.
> >
> > Although the "mistake" first appears in RFC2712 draft 01, RFC2246 final
> > release was published before the final RFC2712.
> > RFC2246 is obsoleted but mentions Fortezza, which RFC2712 doesn't.
> RFC5246
> > being the only non obsoleted child of RFC2246 mentionning the Fortezza
> > group, it looked more natural to suggest the errata at this place instead
> > of RFC2712 which is fully dedicated to Kerberos.
> >
> >
> > best regards
> > Eugène
> >
> >
> >
> > Le mar. 26 juin 2018 à 15:21, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>; a écrit :
> >
> > > First, I think this is editorial.  After all these years, I’m not
> really
> > > sure it’s an interop problem.
> > >
> > > Second, if I were making this I would have placed the errata against
> > > RFC2712 where the values were assigned.  It’s not really TLS1.2’s
> place to
> > > clear this up.
> > >
> > > spt
> > >
> > > > On Jun 26, 2018, at 08:28, RFC Errata System <
> rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>;
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5246,
> > > > "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2".
> > > >
> > > > --------------------------------------
> > > > You may review the report below and at:
> > > > http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5409
> > > >
> > > > --------------------------------------
> > > > Type: Technical
> > > > Reported by: Eugene Adell <eugene.adell@gmail.com>;
> > > >
> > > > Section: Appendix A.5
> > > >
> > > > Original Text
> > > > -------------
> > > >   Note: The cipher suite values { 0x00, 0x1C } and { 0x00, 0x1D } are
> > > >   reserved to avoid collision with Fortezza-based cipher suites in
> > > >   SSL 3.
> > > >
> > > > Corrected Text
> > > > --------------
> > > >   Note: The cipher suite values { 0x00, 0x1C } and { 0x00, 0x1D } are
> > > >   reserved to avoid collision with Fortezza-based cipher suites in
> > > >   SSL 3. The cipher suite value { 0x00, 0x1E } firstly also assigned
> to
> > > >   Fortezza has been released and has since been be reassigned.
> > > >
> > > > Notes
> > > > -----
> > > > RFC 2712 (Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer
> > > Security) in its Draft 01 version introduces three new cipher suites
> > > colliding with the three Fortezza ones. The Draft 02 version partially
> > > corrects that, by moving the Kerberos cipher suites values by two.
> > > > This omission of the third cipher suite has never been corrected, and
> > > this remains in the same state in the final RFC 2712, RFC 2246 and its
> > > successors including this one.
> > > >
> > > > Changing the first Kerberos cipher suite value, or moving all of
> them,
> > > would now not make any sense. Enhancing the note as suggested is
> probably
> > > enough to mention how one Fortezza cipher suite disappeared.
> > > >
> > > > Instructions:
> > > > -------------
> > > > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> > > > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> > > > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
> > > > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
> > > >
> > > > --------------------------------------
> > > > RFC5246 (draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-10)
> > > > --------------------------------------
> > > > Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
> > > Version 1.2
> > > > Publication Date    : August 2008
> > > > Author(s)           : T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
> > > > Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> > > > Source              : Transport Layer Security
> > > > Area                : Security
> > > > Stream              : IETF
> > > > Verifying Party     : IESG
> > >
> > >
>