Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing signalling in TLS 1.3?
Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com> Fri, 27 November 2009 07:28 UTC
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Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2009 08:28:20 +0100
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Nelson B Bolyard <nelson@bolyard.me>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] What would be the point of removing signalling in TLS 1.3?
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Subject: Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing signalling in TLS 1.3?
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Thanks Nelson for writing it out. This was exactly what I meant. /Stefan On 09-11-27 6:06 AM, "Nelson B Bolyard" <nelson@bolyard.me> wrote: > On 2009-11-26 13:22 PST, Marsh Ray wrote: >> Stefan Santesson wrote: >>> If you fix the Finished message calculation, making it immune to the >>> renegotiation attack, and making it the standard Finished calculation for >>> 1.3.... Then why would you need to signal that you are using the standard >>> Finished calculation? >> >> So that clients and servers can be upgraded over a period of time >> without causing interoperability problems. > > But clients and servers that are written to speak 1.3 (which doesn't exist > today) would be written to do the right thing from day 1, when they > negotiate version 1.3. There would be no "upgrade over a period of time" > for clients and servers that negotiation version 1.3. > > I'd propose the use of RI in 1.3 this way. > > A 1.3 client that also implements lesser versions MUST send RI in the client > hello, in case the server does not implement 1.3, but implements some lesser > version. > > A 1.3 server that also implements lesser versions MUST send RI in the server > hello when the client hello asks for a version less than 1.3 and the server > hello agrees to negotiate a version less than 1.3. > > A 1.3 server that receives a client hello bearing version 1.3 (or greater) > NEVER returns RI in the server hello when the server hello negotiates > version 1.3 (or greater). > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Dr Stephen Henson
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Robert Relyea
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Yngve N. Pettersen (Developer Opera Software ASA)
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello peter.robinson
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Min Huang
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Pasi.Eronen
- [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Eric Rescorla
- [TLS] Perhaps there's another way. Was: Verify da… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Perhaps there's another way. Was: Verif… Dr Stephen Henson
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Stefan Santesson
- [TLS] What would be the point of removing signall… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Perhaps there's another way. Was: Verif… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Perhaps there's another way. Was: Verif… Dr Stephen Henson
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Perhaps there's another way. Was: Verif… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Simon Josefsson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Yoav Nir