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Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Wed, 03 May 2017 16:12 UTC

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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Date: Wed, 03 May 2017 12:10:12 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT
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> On May 3, 2017, at 12:01 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> 
> The protocol design should avoid setting traps for the unwary.

No, that responsibility falls on libraries.  STEKs are not a trap for the
unweary.  Libraries that support static session tickets by default can be
viewed as such a trap.  So the onus to fix this is on us (OpenSSL team)
not the TLS protocol.

-- 
	Viktor.

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