Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data

Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Tue, 22 March 2016 10:59 UTC

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 11:59:30 +0100
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data
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On Tuesday 22 March 2016 10:45:32 Martin Thomson wrote:
> On 22 March 2016 at 06:40, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>; wrote:
> > Only in theory, in practice you can do most of the same things in
> > GET's as you can in POSTs.
> > 
> > in other words, basically web frameworks can be made to modify
> > server
> > state upon receiving GET request
> 
> Ahh yes, but it's not the *client's* fault if the server does that and
> the client tries multiple times.  The server is entirely responsible
> for the consequences of state modification at that point.

true, but that means that a blanket statement like "Sending GET requests 
in 0-RTT data is safe" is untrue.
-- 
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic