[TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01.txt

Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> Sat, 06 February 2016 20:37 UTC

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From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Sat, 06 Feb 2016 22:36:54 +0200
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Subject: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01.txt
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The draft describes using an opaque ticket (similar to a session 
resumption ticket) to pin the identity of a TLS server. The new version 
addresses several comments on this list, in particular regarding the 
message syntax, and requesting a comparison with TACK - thanks Dave and 
Daniel.

Thanks,
     Yaron


-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: 	New Version Notification for 
draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01.txt
Date: 	Sat, 06 Feb 2016 12:25:54 -0800
From: 	internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: 	Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>



A new version of I-D, draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01.txt
has been successfully submitted by Yaron Sheffer and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket
Revision:	01
Title:		TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets
Document date:	2016-02-06
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		16
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01
Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01

Abstract:
    Fake public-key certificates are an ongoing problem for users of TLS.
    Several solutions have been proposed, but none is currently in wide
    use.  This document proposes to extend TLS with opaque tickets,
    similar to those being used for TLS session resumption, as a way to
    pin the server's identity.  That is, to ensure the client that it is
    connecting to the right server even in the presence of corrupt
    certificate authorities and fake certificates.  The main advantage of
    this solution is that no manual management actions are required.

                                                                                   


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The IETF Secretariat

[TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-she… Yaron Sheffer
Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Benjamin Kaduk