Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension

[Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]>]

On Thu, Apr 12, 2018 at 9:40 PM, Viktor Dukhovni <[e-mail]>
wrote:

>
> > On Apr 13, 2018, at 12:07 AM, Melinda Shore <
> [e-mail]> wrote:
> >
> > I'm okay with putting denial-of-existence in there as a should,
> > but I do feel strongly that pinning belongs in a separate document.
> > As I  said earlier, I have a problem with putting features in protocols
> > that  nobody intends to use.  It's bad enough when it happens by
> > circumstance but doing it deliberately strikes me as a bad idea.
>
> The great irony of the situation, is that present draft already
> describes pinning:
>
>    If TLS applications want to mandate the use of this extension for
>    specific servers, clients could maintain a whitelist of sites where
>    the use of this extension is forced.  The client would refuse to
>    authenticate such servers if they failed to deliver this extension.
>
> And I've seen no discussion or working group consensus to *prohibit*
> such pinning, only observations that it would be rather fragile in
> general.
>

Thanks for pointing this out. I agree that this text is likely to cause
interop problems and should be removed or at least scoped out in
the case where client and server are unrelated. I regret that I didn't
catch it during my IESG review.

-Ekr