Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00

[Arnaud Taddei <[e-mail]>]

Being new to this community, can I actually ask for the analysis of the ‘hundred’s of applications’ which lead to the evolution of TLS 1.3 the way it is today? Was it captured somewhere or shall I reconstruct this history from all the discussions in the mailing lists?

Thank you in advance

> Le 3 oct. 2017 à 00:48, Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]> a écrit :
> 
> 
> Russ,
> 
> On 02/10/17 22:43, Russ Housley wrote:
>>> For starters, though, I'd be interested answers from the authors to
>>> two quick questions, though I suspect I can guess 'em:
>>> 
>>> 1. TLS1.3 has had significant formal analysis. Did the authors or
>>> other proponents here do any such work and if so can you send a
>>> pointer to your results? If not, then I believe the onus is on the
>>> folks who want to break TLS to do that work themselves if they want
>>> to make a serious proposal and it is not ok IMO to try put that
>>> work onto the community who have been working hard for years to
>>> make TLS stronger.
>> 
>> I would be willing to work with the people that did the formal
>> analysis to show the impact of including the extension, and making
>> changes to the extension that are indicated by that analysis.
>> 
> 
> IMO, that's not a good answer. When improving the security
> properties of the protocol it may suffice. When weakening
> the protocol, I strongly believe the onus is on you to have
> done that work ahead of time, so that the damage you are
> proposing the Internet suffers is clear and known and not
> discovered years later.
> 
>>> 2. Which of the hundreds of applications making use of TLS did you
>>> analyse before proposing this? If only a handful, then same comment
>>> wrt where the onus ought lie.
>> 
>> Just like TLS 1.3 has been implemented and tested with many
>> applications during its development, I would expect the same to
>> happen in those environments where there is interest in making use of
>> this extension.
> 
> The TLS WG has spent an awful lot of effort on (I think)
> every single semantic difference between TLS1.2 and TLS1.3.
> (Ortt for example.) You are now asking that everyone else
> do work to figure out how your proposal damages their uses
> of TLS so that this supposed use case is dealt with. I think
> you and other proponents of breaking TLS need to spend that
> effort yourselves. (This is because as you know there is no
> way to limit the damage of your proposal to only the use-cases
> that are the claimed targets for this bad idea.)
> 
> So yes, those answers are as I expected and are just as
> unsurprisingly, utterly unsatisfactory.
> 
> S.
> 
>> 
>> Russ
>> 
>> 
> 
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