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[TLS] Fresh results

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Tue, 01 December 2015 19:28 UTC

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Fresh results
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https://www.nds.rub.de/media/nds/veroeffentlichungen/2015/08/21/Tls13QuicAttacks.pdf

This one looks very nasty to fix. Short of disallowing the use of RSA
certificates for TLS 1.2 with the RSA handshake and in TLS 1.3, I
don't see a good fix. I haven't read this paper in detail yet.

Cross-protocol attacks are the gift that keeps giving.

Sincerely,
Watson

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