Re: [TLS] What does it mean to not include 0-RTT message in the handshake hash?

[Ilari Liusvaara <[e-mail]>]

On Thu, Dec 24, 2015 at 08:08:25PM -0500, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 24, 2015 at 5:48 PM, Dave Garrett <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
> >
> > This last bit stops this, yes. I would prefer the spec say this very
> > explicitly, as right now it doesn't and all I see is a line saying:
> > "If any of these checks fail, the server MUST NOT respond with the
> > extension and must discard all the remaining first flight data (thus
> > falling back to 1-RTT)."
> 
> Well, this is a general requirement any time the record MAC is bad:
> See http://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.section.5.2.2
> "If the decryption fails, a fatal “bad_record_mac” alert MUST be generated."
> 
> > The current text doesn't explicitly say how to handle 0-RTT data that it
> > thinks it should be able to decrypt but can't. After rereading things a bit
> > I think you're correct in that the correct course of action the spec
> > currently expects is to abort, however implementers frequently err on the
> > side of working partially vs not at all when given any wiggle room. A clear
> > hard "MUST abort" on failed decrypt of 0RTT data would deal with this and
> > avoid any other possible misunderstanding. Either do or do not; no try.
> >
> 
> If you have suggested text, I'd be happy to see a PR.

Except that when server is doing 1RTT fallback and skipping 0-RTT data,
then records that get deprotect failure (is that the proper term?) are
ignored instead of generating bad_record_mac like "normal" deprotect
failure would.

Then there's also the case where server is skipping 0-RTT data for retry
(there one can recognize end of data from content-type 23 changing back
to 22).

Then one has to ensure that configuration_id's are never reused: If
client and server disagree about server-valid configuration, the result
can easily be hard failure (instead of fallback).

One server-side trick to ensure non-reuse would be to hash the server
certificate and the configuration messages (with configuration_id being
zeroes of approriate length) using e.g. SHA-256 and then use the resulting
hash as configuration_id.




-Ilari