Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography performance
Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Thu, 13 March 2014 17:29 UTC
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Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 10:29:07 -0700
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography performance
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On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 9:52 AM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote: > On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote: >> On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 9:34 AM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> >> wrote: >>> >>> But I am concerned about the need for PFS on >>> resumption in order to limit the extent of resumption ticket cache >>> compromise; if you're going to lose the 0-RTT resumption for it, might >>> as well pick the best "fast reauthentication" protocol possible, and >>> that might be Watson's. >> >> >> WRT this specific point, I wanted to observe that computational cost >> (within reason) is less important than round trip delay, for a number of >> reasons: > > My concern is in the sense of "this needs to be a security > consideration, and Watson's protocol is worth considering at least as > an option" (modulo IPR, if any). Triple DH is unpatented AFAIK. MQV patent expires soon, but I don't like it. With Triple DH we can use genus 2 for even more speed, and when Kim Laine finishes his PhD, genus 3. Genus 3 is amazing because the arithmetic is modulo a 64 bit prime. We can't do higher genus stuff+MQV because of the lack of an addition formula on the compact forms. Sincerely, Watson Ladd > > Nico > -- > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls -- "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." -- Benjamin Franklin
- [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography performance Watson Ladd
- [TLS] Version negotiation (was: Thoughts on TLS 1… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Version negotiation (was: Thoughts on T… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography perfor… Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography perfor… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography perfor… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography perfor… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography perfor… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography perfor… Trevor Perrin
- Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography perfor… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography perfor… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography perfor… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography perfor… Trevor Perrin
- Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography perfor… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography perfor… Trevor Perrin
- Re: [TLS] Thoughts on TLS 1.3 cryptography perfor… Eric Rescorla