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Re: [TLS] [OPSAWG] CALL FOR ADOPTION: draft-reddy-opsawg-mud-tls

Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com> Tue, 22 September 2020 15:15 UTC

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From: Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 11:15:39 -0400
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To: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
Cc: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>, opsawg <opsawg@ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [OPSAWG] CALL FOR ADOPTION: draft-reddy-opsawg-mud-tls
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I'm not able to understand the new text in Section 6.  Are you saying that
clients MUST include all the listed extensions/features, but MAY also
include extensions/features not listed in the MUD profile?  So the MUD
profile only acts as a "minimum" set of features?

On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 7:34 AM tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Sun, 20 Sep 2020 at 14:05, Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> > On 11 Sep 2020, at 12:40, Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org> wrote:
>> >
>> > On Fri, 11 Sep 2020 12:32:03 +0530
>> > tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >> The MUD URL is encrypted and shared only with the authorized
>> >> components in the network. An  attacker cannot read the MUD URL and
>> >> identify the IoT device. Otherwise, it provides the attacker with
>> >> guidance on what vulnerabilities may be present on the IoT device.
>> >
>> > RFC 8520 envisions that the MUD URL is broadcast as a DHCP option and
>> > over LLDP without - so far as I was able to see - any mechanism by which
>> > it should be meaningfully "encrypted" as to prevent an attacker on your
>> > network from reading it.
>>
>> That’s a bit of an overstatement.  RFC 8520 specifies a component
>> architecture.  It names three ways of emitting a URL (DHCP, LLDP, 802.1X w/
>> certificate).  Two other mechanisms have already been developed (QR code,
>> Device Provisioning Protocol), and a 3rd new method is on the way for
>> cellular devices.
>>
>> I would not universally claim that a MUD URL is secret but neither would
>> I claim it is not.  The management tooling will know which is which, as
>> will the manufacturer, and can make decisions accordingly.
>>
>> This having been said, it seems to me we are off on the wrong foot here.
>> The serious argument that needs to be addressed is Ben’s and EKR's.  We
>> have to be careful about ossification.
>>
>
> In order to address the comments on ossification, we added a new section 6
> to explain the rules to processing the MUD (D)TLS rules to handle unknown
> TLS parameters and updated Section 10 to enable faster update to the YANG
> module. Please see
> https://github.com/tireddy2/MUD-TLS-profile/blob/master/draft-reddy-opsawg-mud-tls-06.txt
>
> -Tiru
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