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Re: [TLS] About encrypting SNI

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Mon, 14 April 2014 14:52 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2014 10:51:23 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] About encrypting SNI
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> I think Rich Salz has outlined very compelling reasons not to support SNI.

While I might quibble with a detail here or there, I do agree with the conclusion.  If you need to protect SNI, then TOR or to a lesser extent TLS-in-TLS can be used.

Russ

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