[TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem-01.txt
Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> Mon, 01 June 2026 18:05 UTC
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Date: Mon, 01 Jun 2026 21:05:04 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem-01.txt
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On Fri, May 29, 2026 at 10:53:57PM +0200, Muhammad Usama Sardar wrote: > Thanks all for the comments. Some thoughts inline: > > - This concerns KEMs in general and is independent of > > draft-ietf-tls-mlkem, ML-KEM, and PQ. [...] > > > > I don’t think a formal FATT process should be started. I want > > X25519MLKEM758 published as soon as possible. > > > > > > Can you explain why the synmmetric argument in your draft does not hold > > for hybrid key exchange? > > > FWIW, I tried to address the concern on hybrid/X25519MLKEM758 already in > Sec. 4.1 [0]. > > I would like to clarify that I am not at all proposing to > block X25519MLKEM758. Please let me know exactly where there is this > ambiguity in Sec. 4.1. Happy to rephrase it or clarify it. That does not address the concerns. The same issue _does_ appply to X25519MLKEM768 — as I and some others have already explained. The arguments about "some level of symmetry" are unsound. Moreover, I do not think it is possible to prove soundness of X25519MLKEM768 without proving soundness of stand-alone ML-KEM — as soundness of X25519MLKEM768 includes it having hybrid property, meaning it is still secure if ML-KEM is secure, no matter how throughly X25519 is destroyed. Conversely, if stand-alone ML-KEM is not sound, then X25519MLKEM768 is not sound either. -Ilari
- [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-usa… Muhammad Usama Sardar
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… John Mattsson
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Muhammad Usama Sardar
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Nathanael Ritz
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-usam… Nadim Kobeissi
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Nathanael Ritz
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Nathanael Ritz
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Ilari Liusvaara
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… David Stainton
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Jacob Appelbaum
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Simon Josefsson
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Ilari Liusvaara
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Muhammad Usama Sardar
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Peter C