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Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)

Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com> Tue, 13 November 2018 20:19 UTC

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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 20:18:57 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/6S7NC4wtVXP011-3K6CrSseWjiQ>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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> Nor have I, and I rather think that introducing fixed-(EC)DH ciphers into TLS was a mistake, and glad to see them gone in TLS 1.3.

I agree with the sentiment, but there is a concerted effort to bring fixed (EC)DH to TLS 1.3:
https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103500_103599/10352303/01.01.01_60/ts_10352303v010101p.pdf

It seems that a client that is not willing to participate has to actively look for and reject server certs with "VisibilityInformation" in them.
Except this won't always help, because "In some essential circumstances, the visibility information field may be omitted."

Cheers,

Andrei

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