Re: [TLS] [certid] fyi: paper on compelled, certificate creation attack and applicable appliance

ArkanoiD <ark@eltex.net> Thu, 25 March 2010 04:13 UTC

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Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2010 07:14:02 +0300
From: ArkanoiD <ark@eltex.net>
To: =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
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Cc: certid@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] [certid] fyi: paper on compelled, certificate creation attack and applicable appliance
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Well, that's quite obvious that PKI in the "big internet" as we know it is
just a card house: if *ANY* CA we trust get compromised or mailicious, it
is all flawed. There is nothing we can do besides examining chain of trust
manually and watching for certificate changes. The TOFU technology described there is quite obvious, i always wondered why ssh has it and browsers do not.

It is completely out of the scope of the certid list, though :-(