Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extensions security considerations

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Thu, 05 July 2018 02:39 UTC

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Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2018 22:39:19 -0400
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extensions security considerations
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On Thu, Jul 05, 2018 at 12:31:02PM +1000, Martin Thomson wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 2:21 PM Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>; wrote:
> > 1.  Do you support the working group taking on future work on a pinning mechanism (based on the modifications or another approach)?
> 
> I don't think that pinning is a good idea.  We've experience that
> suggests that it's more of a footgun than a useful mechanism.  That
> isn't to say that there isn't a domain where it makes sense.

Did you oppose MTA-STS?  The proposed "pinning" is very much like
a simpler form of MTA-STS, and nothing unlike HPKP.

Perhaps it would be much less confusing if we stopped calling it
"pinning" (which seems to be a traumatic memory trigger for the
HTTP community).  We can call this "strict TLS DANE chain" or some
such, which is a much better analogy in any case.

-- 
	Viktor.