[TLS] Substitute for renegotiation in TLS 1.3

Albe Laurenz <laurenz.albe@wien.gv.at> Mon, 23 February 2015 10:46 UTC

From: Albe Laurenz <laurenz.albe@wien.gv.at>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Substitute for renegotiation in TLS 1.3
Thread-Index: AdBPVfr3TMYz4bcwRuSOLkFAobMc+w==
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2015 10:46:29 +0000
Message-ID: <A737B7A37273E048B164557ADEF4A58B3659F13D@ntex2010i.host.magwien.gv.at>
Accept-Language: en-US, de-AT
Content-Language: de-DE
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
MIME-Version: 1.0
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/uaiXQzbHgX-2etwl0GdimSXODCI>
Subject: [TLS] Substitute for renegotiation in TLS 1.3
Precedence: list

While researching a renegotiation problem I saw that TLS 1.3 has done away
with this feature altogether.

During the discussion that led to this
(http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg12906.html)
most people seemed to favor a new "rekey" facility as a substitute,
and this consensus is expressed in
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg13176.html

In a first take, this was accomplished by repurposing ChangeCipherSpec
to create a new master secret:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg12609.html

However, in a later commit
(https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/commit/21099bc7ff338d8deae6c3ae832f03dff29840c2)
ChangeCipherSpec was removed, and I can neither find the discussion leading
to that nor any mention in the commit how "rekey" should be accomplished now.

Does that mean that there is no possibility to renegotiate any more?
That would be unfortunate for my use case (encrypted database connections which
can last arbitrarily long).
Moreover, it would go against the consensus on the list, as quote above.

Yours,
Laurenz Albe

[TLS] Substitute for renegotiation in TLS 1.3 Albe Laurenz
Re: [TLS] Substitute for renegotiation in TLS 1.3 Ilari Liusvaara
Re: [TLS] Substitute for renegotiation in TLS 1.3 Albe Laurenz