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Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Sun, 13 March 2016 14:02 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2016 15:01:56 +0100
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data
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On Sun, Mar 13, 2016 at 2:51 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:
>
> > That allows
> > the
> > experts in those protocols to do their own analysis, rather than somehow
> > making it the responsibility of the TLS WG. I agree that this is a sharp
> > object
> > and I'd certainly be happy to have such a requirement in 1.3.
>
> So again, I totally understand the reluctance to consider all of the
> foo/TLS options within the TLS WG. And I don't even know how one
> might get that done if one wanted. (Hence my asking the WG.)
>
> However, it is the TLS WG that is introducing the dangerous implement
> and as part of a protocol revision that is mainly intended to improve
> security. It seems fair to say that that may be a surprise for folks
> who just want to use TLS.
>
> My guess would be that if we say to all the WG's doing foo/TLS that
> they need to write a new document before they safely can move from
> TLS1.2 to TLS1.3,


This is not an accurate way to represent the situation. Those WGs can safely
move from TLS 1.2 to 1.3 *as long as they don't use 0-RTT*.

-Ekr

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